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Abstract
A decision procedure implemented over a computational trust mechanism
aims to allow for decisions to be made regarding whether some entity or informa-
tion should be trusted. As recognised in the literature, trust is contextual, and we
describe how such a context often translates into a confidence level which should
be used to modify an underlying trust value. Jøsang’s Subjective Logic has long
been used in the trust domain, and we show that its operators are insufficient to ad-
dress this problem. We therefore provide a decision-making approach about trust
which also considers the notion of confidence (based on context) through the in-
troduction of a new operator. In particular, we introduce general requirements that
must be respected when combining trustworthiness and confidence degree, and
demonstrate the soundness of our new operator with respect to these properties.
Keywords: trust, subjective logic, graphical operator
1 Introduction
Trust forms the backbone of human societies, improving system robustness by restrict-
ing the actions of untrusted entities and the use of untrusted information. Trust has also
been studied within multi-agent systems [19], where a trust value is associated with
different agents. This level of trust is utilised by others when selecting partners for
interactions; distrusted agents will rarely be interacted with, reducing their influence
over the system.
Trust mechanisms aim to compute a level of trust based on direct and second-hand
interactions between agents. The latter, commonly referred to as reputation informa-
tion, is obtained from other agents which have interacted with the agent whose trust
is being computed. Aspects of such systems that have been examined include how
to minimise the damage caused by collusion between agents [7], the nature of repu-
tation information [11], and examining trust in specific contexts and agent interaction
configurations [3].
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It has also been recognised that trust is often context dependent. For example,
while you may trust a mechanic (in the context of fixing your car), you would not
trust him to perform heart surgery on you (in the context of a medical problem). One
common approach to dealing with context involves holding a separate trust rating for
each possible context. However, computing trust in the presence of a new context then
becomes difficult, if not impossible [5, 18, 19]. In this paper, we assume that some
sort of metric can be used to determine a similarity measure between contexts, leading
to some confidence measure. This confidence measures how much weight should be
placed in a trust rating in the original context. We express both confidence and trust
using a Subjective Logic opinions [9], and then seek to compute a final trust value
based on both the original trust value and the degree of confidence.
In the next section we provide a running example which further motivates our work.
We also provide a brief overview of Subjective Logic (hereafter evaluated SL). Section
3 describes several core properties that any combination of trust and confidence must
comply with, thus deriving some requirements that have to be satisfied when combining
a SL opinion with another one representing the confidence on the former. Section
4 shows that existing subject logic operators do not meet these properties and then
derives a new operator which we prove to be compliant with the properties. Then we
discuss related and future work in Section 5, and draw conclusions in Section 6.
2 Background and Motivations
In this work we focus on trust relations where the truster “depends” (using the same
terminology of [4]) on a trustee. As a concrete example, we examine the case where a
trustee is responsible for providing some information to a truster, as exemplified by the
following scenario.
Example 1. Let X be a military analyst who is collecting evidences in order to decide
whether or not a specific area contains a certain type of weapon. In particular, he needs
a datumm from sensor Y , which has a history of failures and this affectsX’s perceived
trustworthiness on Y . Here, X is the truster, and Y the trustee.
In such a scenario, the degree of trustworthiness of Y is normally computed from
historical data (cf. [13]). We consider four extensions of the basic scenario, wherein ad-
ditional contextual information provides different degrees of confidence that X should
trust Y ’s information. More precisely, X can have high, low, uncertain or intermediate
confidence in Y ’s information.
We begin with a scenario where X has high confidence in their trust computation,
as they have no reason to doubt that their original (perceived) trustworthiness degree
should not be the case.
Example 1 (Continued). High confidence. Suppose thatX knows that Y was recently
maintained, and therefore has no reason to believe that Y should not be trustworthy.
At the same time, however, Y has had a history of (random) failures, meaning that
X does not completely trust Y ’s reports. In such a scenario, it seems reasonable that
X should compute a degree of trustworthiness directly from historical interactions, as
2
they have no reason for believing that this computed degree of trust does not hold in
such a situation.
This scenario can be contrasted with a low confidence scenario, where additional
knowledge allows X to identify a different context, affecting the perceived degree of
trustworthiness of reports from Y . This is captured by the following scenario.
Example 1 (Continued). Low confidence. Suppose that X knows that Y ’s failures
usually occur after a sandstorm, and that the data of interest was obtained following
such an event. This is a strong reason for believing that the data collected are incorrect,
despite the degree of trustworthiness which has been derived from the past interactions
with Y . In such a situation, confidence in the degree of trustworthiness of Y will be
very low.
A third limiting case occurs when there are reasons to believe that the current con-
text does affect the trust computation, but no information is available regarding how it
is affected. This is exemplified by the following situation.
Example 1 (Continued). Uncertainty. Consider the case where Y is in an area under
the control of the enemy. Since the enemy can act to deceive Y , X might adopt a
prudent approach and decide not to consider the information provided by Y . This is
not because X does not believe it, but rather because Y might (but is not necessarily)
being deceived by the enemy. Here, there is complete uncertainty with regards to the
degree of trustworthiness associated with Y ’s reports.
Finally, we can also identify an intermediate case, where it is known that the current
situation negatively affects the degree of trustworthiness, and where an estimate of this
effect can be determined. This is illustrated in the following scenario.
Example 1 (Continued). Intermediate confidence. Suppose that Y is known to op-
erate well under certain environmental conditions, and that X must decide how to act
in a situation that violates these parameters1. In this case X knows that the data they
receive is somewhat accurate (given knowledge of Y ’s behaviour), and can therefore
have some confidence in their level of trust of Y .
In the above scenarios, we utilised two terms with a clear intuitive meaning, namely
trustworthiness and confidence. These have well-established definitions in literature,
which usually refer to the notion of trust.
Definition 1 (From [4]). Trust is a relation between:
• an agent X (truster) which is a cognitive agent;
• an addressee Y (trustee) which is an agent in the broader sense of this term;
• a casual process (act/performance) and its results, viz. an act α of Y possibly
producing an outcome p desirable because it includes (or corresponds to) a goal
of X;
1A similar example dealing with GPS data is described by [2].
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• a goal of X;
• a context C or situation or environment where X takes into account Y and/or
where Y is supposed to act.
Below, using the notation introduced in [4], we abbreviate the trust relation as
TRUST (X,Y,C, τ, gX), meaning that X trusts (in the information provided by) Y
in the context C for performing action α (executing task τ ) and realising the result p
that includes or corresponds to her goal gX .
One of the factors that determines the existence and the degree of this trust relation
is the level or degree of trustworthiness in Y that X is judged to have.
Definition 2 (Adapted from [4]). Given an agent X (truster), an addressee Y (trustee),
a task τ , a goal gX and a context C, the trustworthiness of Y is a property of Y
in relation to a potential partner X , concerning a task τ for reaching a goal gX in a
context C: in symbols XTWY . If XTWY = DT , DT ∈ Rn for some n ∈ N, n > 0,
then DT is the degree of trustworthiness of Y in relation to a potential partner X .
As noted in [4], XTWY is one of the bases of the TRUST (X,Y,C, τ, gX) rela-
tion, but the latter cannot be reduced to the former. In [4] several ingredients of trust
are considered, but in this paper we concentrate on only two of the components that
contribute to the relation, namely trustworthiness and confidence. While the other ele-
ments must also be considered, we believe that addressing these two components goes
a long way in the computation of trust. Therefore, in this paper we aim only to deter-
mine a degree of trust given some perceived degree of trustworthiness in an information
source together with a degree of confidence in the context under which the information
is provided.
Definition 3 (Adapted from [24]). Given an agentX (truster), an addressee Y (trustee),
a task τ , a goal gX , a contextC, and the trustworthiness of Y XTWY , the confidence of
X in XTWY (XCXTWY ) represents the reliance of the trustworthiness in the context
C. If XCXTWY = DC , DC ∈ Rn for some n ∈ N, n > 0 is the degree of confidence
of X in XTWY .
Following [12], we express both the degree of trustworthiness and the degree of
confidence using Subjective Logic (SL). This formalism extends probability theory
expressing uncertainty about the probability values themselves, which makes it useful
for representing trust degrees. We now proceed to provide a brief overview of SL
mainly based on [9].
Like Dempster-Shafer evidence theory [6, 21], SL operates on a frame of discern-
ment, denoted by Θ. A frame of discernment contains the set of possible system states,
only one of which represents the actual system state. These are referred to as atomic,
or primitive, system states. The powerset of Θ, denoted by 2Θ, consists of all possible
unions of primitive states. A non-primitive state may contain other states within it.
These are referred to as substates of the state.
Definition 4. Given a frame of discernment Θ, we can associate a belief mass assign-
ment mΘ(x) with each substate x ∈ 2Θ such that
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1. mΘ(x) ≥ 0;
2. mΘ(∅) = 0;
3.
∑
x∈2Θ
mΘ(x) = 1.
For a substate x, mΘ(x) is its belief mass.
Belief mass is an unwieldy concept to work with. When we speak of belief in a
certain state, we refer not only to the belief mass in the state, but also to the belief
masses of the state’s substates. Similarly, when we speak about disbelief, that is, the
total belief that a state is not true, we need to take substates into account. Finally, SL
also introduces the concept of uncertainty, that is, the amount of belief that might be
in a superstate or a partially overlapping state. these concepts can be formalised as
follows.
Definition 5. Given a frame of discernment Θ and a belief mass assignment mΘ on Θ,
we define the belief function for a state x as
b(x) =
∑
y⊆x
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
The disbelief function as
d(x) =
∑
y∩x=∅
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
And the uncertainty function as
u(x) =
∑
y ∩ x 6= ∅
y 6⊆ x
mΘ(y) where x, y ∈ 2Θ
These functions have two important properties. First, they all range between zero
and one. Second, they always sum to one, meaning that it is possible to deduce the
value of one function given the other two.
Boolean logic operators have SL equivalents. It makes sense to use these equivalent
operators in frames of discernment containing a state and (some form of) the state’s
negation. A focused frame of discernment is a binary frame of discernment containing
a state and its complement.
Definition 6. Given x ∈ 2Θ, the frame of discernment denoted by Θ˜x, which contains
two atomic states, x and ¬x, where ¬x is the complement of x in Θ, is the focused
frame of discernment with focus on x.
Let Θ˜x be the focused frame of discernment with focus on x of Θ. Given a belief
mass assignment mΘ and the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions for x (b(x),
d(x) and u(x) respectively), the focused belief mass assignment,mΘ˜x on Θ˜
x is defined
as
mΘ˜x(x) = b(x)
mΘ˜x(¬x) = d(x)
mΘ˜x(Θ˜
x) = u(x)
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The focused relative atomicity of x (which approximates the role of a prior probability
distribution within probability theory, weighting the likelihood of some outcomes over
others) is defined as
aΘ˜x(x/Θ) = [E(x)− b(x)]/u(x)
For convenience, the focused relative atomicity of x is often abbreviated AΘ˜x(x).
An opinion consists of the belief, disbelief, uncertainty and relative atomicity as
computed over a focused frame of discernment.
Definition 7. Given a focused frame of discernment Θ containing x and its comple-
ment ¬x, and assuming a belief mass assignmentmΘ with belief, disbelief, uncertainty
and relative atomicity functions on x in Θ of b(x),d(x),u(x) and a(x), we define an opin-
ion over x, written ωx as
ωx ≡ 〈b(x), d(x), u(x), a(x)〉
For compactness, Jøsang also denotes the various functions as bx,dx,ux and ax in
place, and we will follow his notation. Furthermore, given a fixed ax, an opinion ω can
be denoted as a 〈bx, dx, ux〉 triple.
Given opinions about two propositions from different frames of discernment, it is
possible to combine them in various ways using operators introduced, above all, in
[9, 13, 14, 15, 16]. Reviewing these operators is beyond the scope of this paper, which
instead is aimed at providing an approach for deciding whether or not to trust a source
of information given a degree of trustworthiness and a degree of confidence.
3 Core Properties and Requirements
In the scenario described in Example 1, an agent X has to determine whether or not
to trust a message m received from Y . X will consider three elements for reaching a
decision:
1. trustworthiness: X has an opinion T concerning the degree of trustworthiness
to assign to Y considering the message m;
2. confidence: X has an opinionC about his own confidence regarding her opinion
T in this specific case;
3. combination: X has to combine T with C in order to achieve an ultimate opin-
ion W on m. This combination has to fulfil the following combination require-
ments:
(a) if C is pure belief, then W = T ;
(b) if C is pure disbelief, then W = C (i.e. 〈0, 1, 0〉);
(c) if C is completely uncertain, then W = C (i.e. 〈0, 0, 1〉);
(d) the degree of belief ofW is always less than or equal to the degree of belief
of T .
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Note that the combination requirements describe the same “prudent” behaviour
which has been presented in Example 1, in particular in the “high confidence”
scenario. Indeed even if X is highly confident in a specific context, this confi-
dence cannot increment the trust degree over the base trustworthiness degree.
Following [16, 15], we utilise SL to instantiate trustworthiness and confidence,
and seek to compute their combination through SL operations2. In doing so, we must
therefore consider the following inputs and requirements:
1. T = 〈bT , dT , uT 〉 derived by statistical observations (e.g. [16]);
2. C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉 considering the specific context at hand;
3. W =
 T if C = 〈1, 0, 0〉C if C = 〈0, 1, 0〉
C if C = 〈0, 0, 1〉
further requiring that bW ≤ bT .
Since 1. and 2. above are inputs, we concentrate on the constraints expressed by 3.,
which require us to consider the problem of how to combine the degree of trustworthi-
ness with the degree of confidence. Existing work, such as [16, 4, 24], concentrate on
computing T . The problem of deriving the degree of confidence from a specific context
(input 2.) is beyond the scope of this work but will form part of our future work.
4 Combining Trustworthiness and Confidence
We begin by noting — as illustrated in Table 1 — that none of the operators provided
by SL [9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 10] satisfy the combination requirements described previously.
Requirement
Operator (a) (b) (c) (d)
Addition (+) No No No No
Subtraction (−) No No No Yes
Multiplication (·) No Yes No No
Division (/) No No No No
Comultiplication (unionsq) No No No No
Codivision (u) No No No No
Discounting (⊗) No No Yes Yes
Cumulative fusion (⊕) No Yes No No
Averaging fusion (⊕) No No No No
Cumulative unfusion (	) No Yes No No
Averaging unfusion (	) No Yes No No
Table 1: Jøsang operators and the satisfaction of the four combination requirements
2Hereafter each opinion will have a fixed relative atomicity of 1
2
.
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Therefore, it is necessary to define a new Subjective Logic operator which complies
with our combination requirements. To derive such an operator, we proceed in three
steps.
1. We identify a legal set of opinions that satisfies combination requirement (d).
This legal set has specific geometric properties, allowing us to project an opinion
onto a bounded plane.
2. We must identify a specific projection method.
3. Finally the method chosen in step 2 is used to project the confidence opinion to
the set of values determined at step 1.
In order to prove the soundness of our approach, we first need to discuss the geom-
etry of Subjective Logic.
4.1 The Geometry of Subjective Logic
A SL opinion O , 〈bO, dO, uO〉 is a point in the R3 space, identified by the coordinate
bO for the first axis, dO for the second axis, and uO for the third axis. However, due
to the requirement that bO + dO + uO = 1, an opinion is a point inside (or at least
on the edges of) the triangle
4
BDU shown in Figure 1, where B = 〈1, 0, 0〉, D =
〈0, 1, 0〉, U = 〈0, 0, 1〉.
Figure 1: The Subjective Logic plane region
Definition 8. The Subjective Logic plane region
4
BDU is the triangle whose vertices
are the points B , 〈1, 0, 0〉, D , 〈0, 1, 0〉, and U , 〈0, 0, 1〉 on a R3 space where the
axes are respectively the one of belief, disbelief, and uncertainty predicted by SL.
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Now | #    »V B| = | #    »V D| = | #    »V U | = 1 and therefore, since angle ∠BVD = pi2 =
∠V U0B , |
#    »
BD| = √2, | #      »U0B| =
√
2
2 = |
#      »
V U0|, it is the case that #      »U0U =
√
3√
2
. Given
that, the angle ∠UBD = arctan( |
#     »
U0U |
| #       »UOB| ) =
pi
3 , triangle
4
BDU is equilateral where each
slide is
√
2 and thus each altitude is
√
3√
2
.
Since each opinion is a point inside triangle
4
BDU , it can be mapped to a point in
Figure 2. This representation is similar to the one used in [9] for representing opinions
in SL, but here the belief and disbelief axes are swapped for reasons that will become
clear below.
Figure 2: An opinion O , 〈bO, dO, uO〉 in SL after the 1 :
√
3√
2
scale. The belief axis is
the line from B0 (its origin) toward the B vertex, the disbelief axis is the line from D0
toward the D vertex, and the uncertainty axis is the line from U0 toward the U vertex
In order to keep the discussion consistent with Jøsang’s work [9], in what follows
we will scale triangle
4
BDU by a factor 1 :
√
3√
2
thus obtaining that | #       »B0B| = | #       »D0D| =
| #      »U0U | = 1. For convenience, we write the following.
1.
1
| #       »B0B|
#       »
B0B =
#»eb as the unit vector of the axis of belief;
2.
1
| #       »D0D|
#       »
D0D =
#»ed as the unit vector of the axis of disbelief;
3.
1
| #      »U0U |
#      »
U0U =
# »eu as the unit vector of the axis of uncertainty.
More precisely however,
1
| #      »U0U |
#      »
U0U is the unit vector of the projection of the unit
vector of the axis of uncertainty on a plane which intersects the plane determined by
the Cartesian product of the unit vector of the axis of belief and the unit vector of
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the axis of disbelief; the points 〈1, 0, 0〉 and 〈0, 1, 0〉 are in that intersection, and the
angle formed by the two planes is arctan( |
#   »
V U |
| #     »V U0| ) = arctan(
√
2) = ϕ (according to
an observer on V ). Therefore, a point
p
| #    »V U |
#    »
V U (a point on the axis of uncertainty
distant p from V ) can be projected into the triangle
4
BDU using a line parallel to the
plane determined by the Cartesian product of the unit vector of the axis of belief and
the unit vector of the axis of disbelief, and the result of the projection will be the point
p¯
| #      »U0U |
#      »
U0U where p¯ = psin(ϕ) = p
(
tan(ϕ)√
1+tan2(ϕ)
)−1
= p
(√
2√
3
)−1
= p
√
3√
2
. The
same line of reasoning line can be applied to the remaining two axes. Given the fact
that the projection introduces a simple scale factor, we ignore it below in order to both
simplify our discussion and maintain consistency with existing work.
With the above in hand, given an opinion O, depicted in Fig. 2, we can determine
bO as the distance (| #          »B0OB |) from the origin of the axis of beliefs (B0) and the projec-
tion of O on the same axis (OB), where the projection is orthogonal (∠OOBB0 = pi2 ).
The projection of O on the axes of disbelief and of uncertainty will determine respec-
tively dO and uO.
These geometric relations lie at the heart of the Cartesian transformation operator
which is the subject of the next subsection.
4.2 The Cartesian Representation of Opinions
As shown in 4.1, an opinion in SL can be represented as a point in a planar figure
(Fig. 2) laying on a Cartesian plane. In this section we will introduce the Cartesian
transformation operator which returns the Cartesian coordinate of an opinion.
First of all, let us define the axes of the Cartesian system we will adopt.
Definition 9. Given the SL plane region
4
BDU , the associated Cartesian system is
composed by two axes, named respectively x, y, where the unit vector of the x axis
#»ex =
1
| #    »BD|
#    »
BD, the unit vector of the y axis #»ey = # »eu , and B is the origin.
Figure 3 depicts this Cartesian system.
The correspondence between the three values of an opinion and the corresponding
coordinate in the Cartesian system we defined is shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given a SL plane region
4
BDU and its associated Cartesian system
〈x, y〉, an opinion O , 〈bO, dO, uO〉 is identified by the coordinate 〈xO, yO〉 s.t.:
• xO ,
dO + uO cos(
pi
3 )
sin(pi3 )
;
• yO , uO.
Proof. Proving that yO , uO is trivial.
Let us focus on the first part of the proposition. Consider Figure 3. Given O,
we note that the for the point P , 1| #   »PO|
#    »
PO = #»eb (i.e.
#    »
PO is parallel to the disbelief
10
Figure 3: An opinion and its representation in the Cartesian system
axis) and 1| #   »BP |
#    »
BP = 1| #   »BU |
#    »
BU (i.e. P is on the line
#    »
BP ), and therefore ∠BPO = pi2 .
Then we must determine Q and R s.t.
#    »
QR =
#    »
PO and yR = 0. By construction
| #    »PO| = | #    »QR| = dO, ∠QRB = pi6 , ∠ORD = pi3 , and xO , |
#   »
BS| = | #    »BR| + | #   »RS|,
where | #    »BR| = dOsin(pi3 ) , and |
#   »
RS| = uOsin(pi3 ) cos(
pi
3 ).
There are some notable elements of Fig. 3 that we will repeatedly use below, and
we therefore define them as follows:
• the angle αO determined by the x axis and the vector #    »BO;
• the three angles (γO, δO, and O) of the triangle
4
ODU , namely the triangle de-
termined by linking the point O with the vertex D and U through straight lines.
Definition 10. Given the SL plane region
4
BDU , given O = 〈bO, dO, uO〉 whose
coordinates are 〈xO, yO〉 where xO ,
dO + uO cos(
pi
3 )
sin(pi3 )
and yO , uO, let us define
and (via trivial trigonometric relations) compute the following.
• αO , ∠OBD =
0 if bO = 1
arctan
(
uO sin(
pi
3 )
dO + uO cos(
pi
3 )
)
otherwise ;
• βO , ∠ODB =
pi
3
if dO = 1
arctan
(
uO sin(
pi
3 )
1− (dO + uO cos(pi3 ))
)
otherwise
;
• γO , ∠ODU = pi
3
− βO;
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• δO , ∠OUD =
0 if uO = 1
arcsin
(
bO
| #    »OU |
)
otherwise ;
• O , ∠DOU = pi − γO − δO;
where | #    »OU | =
√
1
3
(1 + dO − uO)2 + b2O.
The angle αO is called the direction of O.
Equivalently, we can write
#    »
BO or 〈B,αO, | #    »BO|〉.
Finally, as an element of SL is bounded to have its three components between 0
and 1, we are also interested in determining the point MO such that the vector
#         »
BMO
has the maximum magnitude given (a) the direction αO of an opinion O, and (b) MO
is a SL opinion. In other words, determining the magnitude of
#         »
BMO will allow us to
re-define the vector
#    »
BO as a fraction of
#         »
BMO.
Definition 11. Given the SL plane region
4
BDU , andO , 〈bO, dO, uO〉whose coordi-
nates are 〈xO, yO〉 where xO ,
dO + uO cos(
pi
3 )
sin(pi3 )
and yO , uO, and αO , ∠OBD =
arctan
(
uO sin(
pi
3 )
dO + uO cos(
pi
3 )
)
, let us define MO , 〈xMO , yMO 〉 as the intersection of
the straight line passing for O and B, and the straight line passing for U and D, and
thus define the following.
• xMO ,
2− yO + tan(αO) xO
tan(αO) +
√
3
;
• yMO , −
√
3 xMO + 2.
4.3 The Trustworthiness-Confidence Combination Operator
In this paper, we analyse a single method for projecting the confidence opinion C
into the space of SL opinions in order to satisfy the requirement that bW ≤ bT . In
particular, we rely only on straight lines, leading to the definition of a new vector
#     »
TC ′ = 〈T, αC′ , |
#     »
TC ′|〉 given the points T and C. Figure 4 depicts this situation.
In particular, αC′ is such that the following proportion holds: αC : pi3 = τC′ : T ,
where τC′ is the angle ∠DTC′ , and |
#     »
TC ′| is such that the following proportion holds:
| #    »BC| : | #         »BMC | = |
#     »
TC ′| : | #          »TMC′ |. αC′ represents the angle that the vector
#     »
TC ′
makes to the vector parallel to the x axis, and thus, from Definition 10, we can write
#     »
TC ′ = 〈T, αC′ , |
#     »
TC ′|〉.
In other words, when αC = 0, then τC′ = 0 and thus we are projecting C in
the direction 1| #   »TD|
#    »
TD, while if αC = pi3 then we project C in the direction
1
| #   »TU
#    »
TU .
It is important to note that due to our choice of using straight lines to project C, the
12
Figure 4: Projection of the confidence opinion and combination with the trustworthi-
ness opinion
available space for projecting C is reduced from the four-sided figure UDQP (in Fig.
4) to the triangle
4
TDU .
Given the new vector
#     »
TC ′ = 〈T, αC′ , |
#     »
TC ′|〉, the result of the combination of the
trustworthiness opinion T and the confidence opinion O is the opinion W determined
as the vector sum
#      »
BW =
#    »
BT +
#     »
TC ′ in the Cartesian system 〈x, y〉. This leads us to
our core result.
Definition 12. Given a trustworthiness opinion T = 〈bT , dT , uT 〉 and a confidence
opinion C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉, the combination of T and C is W = T ◦ C, where:
• uW = uT + sin(αC′)|
#     »
TC ′|;
• dW = dT + (uT − uW ) cos(pi3 ) + cos(αC′) sin(pi3 )|
#     »
TC ′|.
In particular:
• αC′ = αC Tpi
3
− βT ;
• | #     »TC ′| = |
#    »
BC|
| #         »BMC |
| #          »TMC′ | =
= rC | #          »TMC′ |
with rC =
| #   »BC|
| #        »BMC | , and
13
| #          »TMC′ | =

2 bT if αC′ =
pi
2
2√
3
uT if αC′ = −pi
3
2√
3
(1− uT ) if αC′ = 2
3
pi
2
√
tan2(αC′) + 1
| tan(αC′) +
√
3| bT otherwise
We now show that the combination requirements specified earlier are satisfied by
◦.
Theorem 1. Given T = 〈bT , dT , uT 〉, C = 〈bC , dC , uC〉, and W = T ◦ C, then:
1. W = 〈bW , dW , uW 〉 is an opinion;
2. if C = 〈1, 0, 0〉, then W = T ;
3. if C = 〈0, 1, 0〉, then W = C;
4. if C = 〈0, 0, 1〉, then W = C;
5. bW ≤ bT .
Proof. Proving the thesis in the limit case is trivial. In the following we will assume,
without loss of generality, that αC′ 6= pi2 , αC′ 6= −pi3 , αC′ 6= 23pi.
Point 1. W = 〈bW , dW , uW 〉 must respect
uW + dW ≤ 1 (1)
From Def. 12 it is clear that Equation 1 can be rewritten as follows.
uT + dT+
+
rC
2
2
√
tan2(αC′) + 1
| tan(αC′) +
√
3| bT (sin(αC′) +
√
3 cos(αC′)) ≤ 1
(2)
In turn, using the relation tan(αC′) =
sin(αC′ )
cos(αC′ )
, this can be rewritten as
uT + dT + rCbT ≤ 1
which entails the requirement that rC ≤ 1−uT−dTbT = bTbT = 1. However, from defini-
tion 12, we know that rC ≤ 1, fulfilling this requirement.
Point 2. C = 〈1, 0, 0〉 implies that | #    »BC| = 0 and thus rC = 0. Therefore, from
Def. 12, uW = uT + sin(αC′)rC | #          »TMC′ | = uT and this results also implies that
dW = dT . Since Point 1 shows that W is an opinion in SL, we conclude that W = T .
Point 3. C = 〈0, 1, 0〉 implies that rC = 1, and αC = 0 which, in turn, im-
plies, from Definition 12, that αC′ = −βT . Also from Definition 12, uW = uT −
sin(βT )
2
√
tan2(βC)+1
|−tan(βC)+
√
3| . Then, recalling Definition 10 and the trigonometric property
that sin(arctan(v)) = v√
1+v2
, we obtain
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uW = uT −
√
3uT
1− (dT + uT2 )
1− (dT + uT2 )√
3(1− dT − uT )
bT = 0 (3)
Similarly,
dW = dT +
uT
2
+
1− (dT + uT2 )
1
2 (1− dT − uT )
bT =
= dT +
uT
2
+ 1− dT − uT
2
= 1
(4)
Therefore, from Eq. 3 and Eq. 4, and from Point 1, W = 〈0, 1, 0〉 = C.
Point 4. C = 〈0, 0, 1〉 implies rC = 1, αC′ =
pi
3 T
pi
3
− βT = T − βT = 23pi − δt.
Therefore, we obtain that uW = uT + bT2 (1 +
√
3
tan(δT )
). From Definition 10 and the
trigonometric property that tan(arcsin(v)) = v√
1−v2 we obtain that uW = uT +
bT
2 +
√
3
2
√
| #    »TU |2 − b2T . From Definition 10 we can write:
uW = uT +
bT
2
+
√
3
2
1 + dT − uT√
3
=
1
2
(1 + bT + dT + uT ) = 1
(5)
Similarly, dW = dT + uT2 − 12 +
√
3
2
1
sin(δT )
bT = dT +
uT
2 − 12 +
√
3
2 |
#    »
TU |. From
Def. 10 we have
dW = dT +
uT − 1
2
+
3
4
bT −
√
3
4
bT
1 + dT − uT√
3bT
=
1
4
(4dT + 2uT − 2 + 3bT − 1 + uT − dT ) = 0
(6)
From Equations 5 and 6, together with Point 1, it follows that W = 〈0, 0, 1〉 = C.
Point 5. Suppose instead bW > bT .
1− dW − uW > 1− dT − uT
dW + uW < dT + uT
dT + sin(αC′ +
pi
3
)
rC
sin(αC′ +
pi
3 )
+ uT < dT + uT
rC < 0
but 0 ≤ rC ≤ 1. Quod est absurdum.
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5 Related and Future Works
In this paper we describe an approach to computing a final level of trust given degrees
of trustworthiness and confidence expressed as SL opinions. The main body of related
work therefore relates to the calculation of degrees of confidence, as well as works
detailing SL operators for opinion combination.
The first topic has received only limited attention in the literature. In particular,
[1] describe — in very general terms — the importance of confidence in the process
that leads to the definition of the degree of trust, but do not provide any quantitative
approach for combining the different components of trust. More recently, [23, 8, 17]
discussed TRAVOS, a trust model that is built upon probability theory and based on
observations of past interaction between agents. Moreover TRAVOS calculates the
confidence of its trust values given an acceptable level of error: if the confidence level
of a trust value is below a predetermined minimum level, TRAVOS will seek witness
information about the target agent’s past performance. TRAVOS in turn was extended
in [22], but this fundamental mechanism remains unchanged. Critically, this notion of
confidence is based on the number of previous interactions and level of reputational
information obtained, rather than context as in the current work.
Interestingly, there are correlations between the level of confidence and the pres-
ence of obfuscated information. Investigations into the links between trust and such
obfuscated data have only recently begun [2, 20], and to our knowledge, no approaches
have been described for deriving a trust degree for a source of information which is
obfuscating data.
Our work suggests several avenues of future work. First, we intend to investigate
the overlaps between confidence obtained from systems such as TRAVOS and contex-
tual confidence as described here. We will study how a degree of confidence can be
derived from the context, and the differences with TRAVOS’ notion of confidence. We
also seek to determine whether our newly defined operator is beneficial in the context
of reputational information and transitive trust. In order to do so, we intend to perform
both an empirical and theoretical comparison between our system and existing ones.
It is important to stress once more however that confidence, as expressed in existing
work, does not deal with different contexts as we do in the current work.
Another avenue of future work will investigate how different levels of confidence
can be used to reveal the presence of obfuscated information, improving the decision
making process in such situations.
With regards to other SL operators, both the deduction and the discounting operator
proposed in the literature [15] bear some similarities to the operator proposed in this
paper. The SL deduction operator considers three opinions, namely an opinion for an
event p, an opinion for the derivation rule p → c, and an opinion for the derivation
rule ¬p → c, and deduces an opinion on the event c by “projecting” the precedent
opinion triangle in the subsequent sub-triangle (cf. [14]). However, the deduction
operator and the trustworthiness-confidence-combination operator we provide in this
paper are not directly comparable, as Jøsang’s deduction operates on three elements,
while our operator is binary (this is also the reason why we did not consider deduction
or abduction in Table 1).
The discount operator was designed to propagate trust degrees across a trust net-
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work. In particular, the situation in Example 1 where an agentX is deciding whether or
not to trust a source of information Y can be rephrased as follows. An agent X should
decide whether or not to trust another agent K which is a mediator between X and the
source of information Y such that K has his own degree of trust of Y . However, this
situation is different to the one we examine — a mediator acts either as a repeater, and
in this case X will always trust K, or is a fully-fledged agent, in which case X’s trust
on K about messages derived from Y must consider the beliefs, intentions, and desires
of K.
A deeper (and eventually empirical too) evaluation of the differences between Jøsang
discount and deduction operators therefore forms another important strand of envi-
sioned future work. In addition, we intend to analyse these and other SL operators and
properties from a geometrical perspective.
Finally, we are currently working on providing different ways for projecting the
confidence opinion into the set of SL opinions satisfying the fourth combination re-
quirement. As Figure 4 depicts, this will lead (in general) to a four-sided figure, un-
like the current work, where the projected opinion is always inside a triangle which is
strictly contained within that four-side figure. To do so, we will consider non-linear
projection methods in the future, as opposed to the simple linear projection method
applied in the current work.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced an approach for deriving a trust degree on a source of
information given a degree of trustworthiness and a confidence degree, with the lat-
ter potentially being determined by the current interaction context. In particular, the
trustworthiness degree can be derived from past interactions with the source of infor-
mation, which leads to a SL opinion. By expressing confidence as a SL opinion, we are
able to describe an approach for merging the two degrees, this being one of our main
contributions. Critically, we have shown that none of the existing SL operators sat-
isfy the requirements necessary to perform this merging. Since our proposed operator
is based on geometrical properties, we also introduce a formal geometric method for
analysing SL opinions. While the contributions of this paper are clearly important, this
work opens up a rich direction for future work, which we have already begun actively
pursuing.
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